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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last twenty years, 
several central banks found that the 
traditional monetary policy strategy 
(based on intermediate variables such as 
monetary aggregates and exchange rate) 
has lost its efficiency. Therefore, the 
credibility of these central banks has 
became vulnerable. As the answer to this 
problem, some developed countries – 
New Zealand (1990), Canada (1991), the 
United Kingdom (1992), and Sweden 
(1993) – found the solution to implement 
the monetary policy strategy that targets 
inflation directly.  
Since then, more than 25 
recently industrialized and emerging and 
former socialist economies from Central 
and East Europe, Latin America and East 
Asia have switched  to inflation targeting 
as the framework for their monetary 
policy,  All inflation targeters managed to 
reduce the inflation rate after the 
implementation of this new strategy. The 
experince showed that, untill now, no one 
of the adopters of inflation targeting has 
gave up to this regime. 
 
2. Inflation targeting – a succeessful 
strategy 
 
Inflation targeting represents a 
superior step taken for controlling 
inflation, while being one of the most 
recent and popular monetary policy 
strategy.  
 
2.1. Concept of inflation targeting 
  
Inflation targeting represents that 
approach of monetary policy 
characterized by the announcement of 
numerical inflation target for one or more 
horizons and an explicit recognition that 
the low and stable inflation is the primary 
goal of monetary policy (Bernanke and 
Mishkin, 1997).  
Inflation targeting is 
characterized by five key elements 
(Mishkin, 2000):  
1) the public announcement of 
inflation targets in terms of a medium- 
term numerical targets;  
2) an institutional commitment to 
make price stability the primary goal of 
monetary policy;  
3) a strategy that takes into 
account not just monetary aggregates or 
the exchange rate, but also many 
variables used for establishing the policy 
instruments;  
4) an increased transparency of 
the monetary policy strategy due to the 
communication with the public and the 
markets about the objectives, and 
decisions of the central bank;  
5) an increased accountability of 
the central bank for attaining the inflation 
targets.  
Although many monetary 
authorities announce publicly the 
numerical target for inflation, that does 
not imply that they practice inflation 
targeting, because inflation targeting 
requires the fulfilment of the other four 
elements for this strategy to be 
sustainable over the medium-term. 
Thus, we can make a distinction 
between a country which targets inflation 
and the other which only makes a public 
announcement concerning the 
anticipated level of inflation for the next 
period. In the second situation, the 
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the monetary policy towards the 
attainment of the set inflation target, 
because this might compromise other 
proposed macroeconomic objectives 
(Brash, 1999).   
     
2.2. Stict versus flexible inflation targeting 
 
In practice, we can distinguish 
two types of inflation targeting (Walsh, 
2009): 
  Strict inflation targeting is a 
framework of monetary policy exclusively 
focused on the control of inflation. Since 
it is not preoccupied by the short-term 
tradeoff between inflation control and real 
economic stability, strict inflation 
targeting is too costly to be desirable.  
  Flexible inflation targeting is a 
framework of monetary policy aimed at 
attainment low and stable inflation while, 
in the same time, minimizing fluctuations 
in the real economy. The words “inflation 
targeting” reflect the primacy of inflation 
as the final objective of monetary policy. 
The word “flexible” reveal the short-term 
tradeoff between inflation control and real 
economic stability. Since there exist a 
time lag between the monetary policy 
decisions and their effect on inflation and 
real economy, an effective strategy of 
flexible inflation targeting depends on 
forecasts of inflation and real economy, 
being illustrated as “forecast targeting” 
(Svensson, 2009). 
 
2.3. Conditions for adopting inflation 
targeting 
 
 The initial conditions that sustain 
an inflation targeting framework can be 
grouped into four major categories
 
(Carare, Schaechter, Stone, Zelmer, 
2002).   
The first and most important 
condition is that central bank to pursue 
an inflation objective and to be 
accountable for meeting this objective:  
  The central bank should have a 
mandate to pursue inflation target and 
enjoy a sufficient degree of instrument 
independence. Furthermore, other 
objectives must be subordinated to the 
inflation objective. The central bank 
should have a high degree of 
independence when setting the monetary 
instrument as needed to pursue the 
targets.  
  The accountability of the central 
bank is important as policy transmission 
lags obstruct the supervision of monetary 
policy performance by the public. 
Accountability motivates the central bank 
to meet its targets and to communicate 
its decisions to the public.   
The second group of conditions 
refers to the fact that the inflation target 
should not be subordinated to other 
objectives: 
  It must not show any signals of 
“fiscal dominance”. Thus, the conduct of 
monetary policy should not be ruled or 
constrained by considerations that are 
purely fiscal. The borrowings from the 
central bank should be as low as 
possible or nonexistent.   
  A country should have strong 
external stability to enable monetary 
policy to focus on achieving the inflation 
target without being affected by 
developments in the foreign exchange 
market. The policy measures used for 
reducing the conflicts between inflation 
target and external stability are 
represented mainly by the prudential 
supervision.  
  The inflation rate should be low 
enough to ensure a reasonable degree of 
monetary control. The majority of the 
industrial countries decided to adopt the 
new regime in times when inflation was 
declining, but there were also some 
countries which started with high rates of 
inflation.  
The third category of conditions 
refers to the stability and development of 
financial system: 
  The financial stability enables 
monetary policy to persue the inflation 
targets and not be preocuppied about the 
healt of financial sector. Financial stability 
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vulnerability to crises. By having a stable 
financial system, the central bank’s 
credibility is enhanced and the inflation 
expectations can be easily anchored to 
the inflation target. 
  A well-developed and deep 
financial market contribute to a better 
implementation of inflation targeting 
because it ensures that movements in 
asset prices communicate information to 
the central bank on economic basics and 
market expectations about prospect 
monetary actions.  
The last set of conditions refers 
to choosing the appropriate monetary 
instruments to pursue the inflation target: 
  A central bank should be able to 
influence inflation through its monetary 
policy tools and have a resonable 
understanding of the links between the 
stance of monetary policy and inflation. 
All central bank that practice inflation 
targeting use exclusively market-based 
instruments of monetary policy. 
  The transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy is represented by the 
connection between changes in the 
monetary stance and their effect on the 
operating target, and finally, inflation. The 
changes will be more effective as the 
transmission links will be stronger and 
better understood.  
  Exchange rate objective must be 
clearly subordinated to the inflation 
target. The central bank should clarify the 
fact that foreign market exchange 
interventions and changes in the policy 
interest rate are aimed only at smoothing 
the effects of temporary shocks. 
 Inflation forecasting has an 
essential role in an inflation targeting 
regime. The inflation forecasts made by 
central bank should take into 
consideration all available information on 
the outlook for inflation. 
  Fiscal policy and public debt 
management should be coordinated in 
order to support inflation targeting. 
Besides the already mentioned 
conditions, the monetary authorities 
should also consider the following four 
essential elements (Masson, Savastano, 
Sharma, 1997):  
 explicit inflation targets for some 
periods ahead; 
  clear and unambiguous 
indications that pursuing those inflation 
targets is the primary objective of 
monetary policy; 
 a model for forecasting inflation 
that uses relevant variables and 
information indicators; 
  a forward-looking operating 
procedure in which the setting of policy 
instruments depends on assessing 
inflationary preasures and where inflation 
forecasts are employed as the major 
intermediate target of monetary policy.  
To design this framework, the 
monetary authorities must possess the 
technical and institutional ability to shape 
and forecast domestic inflation and to 
assess the efficiency of the instrument 
changes. Moreover, they must also have 
a view on the way in which monetary 
impulses affect the main macroeconomic 
variables.  
The requirements mentions beyond 
do not are strict prerequisites, so that the 
miss of one would not impede the 
adoption of inflation targeting regime. 
The practice has revealed that despite 
the problems in achievment of some 
conditions, inflation targeting has worked 
well (Carare, Schaechter, Stone, Zelmer, 
2002).  
Therefore, the adoption of inflation 
targeting has been associated with rapid 
improvements in anchoring both inflation 
and inflation expectations without any 
unfavourable effects on output.  Still, 
though the fulfilment of initial 
requirements may not be decisive before 
adopting the strategy, their improvement 
will be necessary for the success of this 
approach. The evidence from the 
emerging market countries suggests that 
the viability  and the success of the 
inflation targeting seems to depend more 
on the authorities’ commitment and ability 
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changes after adopting it (Batini and 
Laxton, 2006).     
 
3. Strong points and weak points of 
inflation targeting 
 
  Promoters of inflation targeting 
consider that it has several strong points 
in comparison with other operating 
strategies. 
Contrasting with exchange rate 
targeting, inflation targeting regime 
allows monetary policy to focus upon 
national economic problems, thus better 
managing the possible shocks. Unlike 
monetary targeting, inflation targeting has 
the advantage that it does not depend on 
a stable relation between money and 
inflation for its success. But it employs all 
data for finding the best instruments of 
the policy.  Moreover, because the public 
can easily understand it, this strategy is 
highly transparent (Mishkin, 2000).  
This regime increases the 
accountability of central bank due to an 
explicit numerical target for inflation and, 
thus, can reduce the probability that the 
central bank will fall into the time-
inconsistency trap, which is frequently 
caused by political pressures on the 
central bank to promote expansionary 
monetary policy. 
Inflation targeting requires the existence 
of a strong institutional commitment for 
price stability as the primary goal of 
monetary policy (Mishkin, 2000). 
Another strong point of inflation 
targeting consists in stating the target in 
terms of the rate of inflation rather than in 
terms of the price level and on defining 
the target in terms of a price index that is 
very familiar and broadly used by the 
public, such as consumer price index 
(Masson, Savastano, Sharma, 1997).  
Monetary policy is more 
transparent in comparison with other 
strategies due to the communication with 
the public about de monetary policy 
decisions. So, transparency plays a key 
role in communicating to market 
participants the fact that central bank is 
accountable for its performance (Mishkin, 
2000). 
Inflation targeting causes lower 
economic costs in the case of monetary 
policy failures in comparison with other 
strategies. Under exchange rate pegs, for 
example, the costs of policy failure can 
be very large and can lead to high 
inflation, financial and banking crises and 
massive foreign currency reserves 
losses. With inflation targeting the output 
costs of failure will be significantly 
reduce, being limited to a higher inflation 
rate than targeted and slower economic 
growth (Batini and Laxton, 2006).  
  Critics of inflation targeting 
highlight the weak points of this strategy. 
  A first weak point is that 
monetary policy is too rigid, beeing 
focused towards the atainment of the set 
infaltion target and, so that, the other 
objective of monetary policy would be 
neglected. Thus, monetary policy suffers 
of some constrains and central bank 
does not employ discretionary decisions. 
This is the reason for what the inflation 
targeting is called as „constrained 
discretion”, beeing an „intermediate 
monetary arrangement in the rules-
versus-discretion tradeoff” (Schmidt-
Hebbel and Tapia, 2002). 
  Inflation targeting has been 
criticised for focusing only to inflation 
evolution and, therefore, for ignoring 
output and employment. However, this 
strategy enjoys enough flexibility to 
permit for the short run tradeoff between 
output and inflation (Debelle, 1999).  
Contrary to other alternative 
monetary policy strategy, such as 
exchange rates and monetary 
aggregates, the inflation rate cannot be 
easily controlled by the central bank and 
its results include the effects of 
instruments changes, which occur only 
after a considerable lag. This problem is 
critical in emerging countries, where 
inflation rate is reduced from quite high 
levels, due to the difficulty in the controll 
of inflation. In this situation, inflation 
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inflation targets could be missed, and it 
would be very complicate for central bank 
to get credibility from this regime, and for 
public to understand the causes of the 
deviations. This is the reason for what, 
inflation targeting is recommended to be 
adopted after a successful disinflation 
process (Mishkin, 2000). 
High exchange rate volatility 
represents another shortcoming of 
inflation targeting. Because this strategy 
promotes price stability as the primary 
goal of central bank, it could ignore the 
exchange rate, with unfavourable effects 
on exchange rate volatility and economic 
growth (Batini and Laxton, 2006).  
Another disadvantage of this 
approach is that it may not be able to 
guarantee fiscal discipline or avoid fiscal 
dominance. On the long-run, high fiscal 
deficit can generate the collapse of 
inflation targeting since they will be 
probably monetized or public debt eroded 
by a great devaluation, which will cause a 
high inflation.  The success of this 
strategy depends on the absence of 
fiscal dominance and on the 
establishment of an institution 
responsible for monitoring fiscal policy. 
(Mishkin, 2000). 
 
4. The impact of the current financial 
crisis on the inflation targeting 
 
In reply to financial crisis, main 
central banks, no matter what monetary 
policy strategies they apply, have 
considerably reduced their monetary 
policy interest rates aiming to lower real 
interest rates and boost aggregate 
spending. In some countries, such as 
United States, Japan, England, but also 
Euro area, the interest rates were 
lowered towards zero. Once the policy 
rate reaches zero, traditional open 
market operations used for the expansion 
of reserves cannot lower interest rate 
more. These evolutions lead to serious 
debates about the fact that zero lower 
bound policy rates constrains the 
capacity of monetary policy to encourage 
the real economy (Walsh, 2009).  
In spite of the significant decline 
in the interest rates in United States, the 
cost of credit has generally risen. The 
tightening of credit conditions and the 
maintenance of the cost of credit at 
relatively high level, although the central 
banks lowered the monetary policy rate, 
have led to contradicted opinions. Some 
specialists belive that monetary policy 
has been ineffective throughout the 
current financial crisis. This point of view 
was criticized by the other authors, who 
consider that contrary monetary policy 
has been even more effective than 
throughout usual periods because it not 
only reduced the interest rates on 
default-free securities, but also helped 
lower credit spread. Tighter monetary 
policy would cause economic activity to 
contract further, which would create more 
uncertainty, making the financial crisis 
worst, causing economic activity to 
contract further and so on. If interest 
rates fall to close to the zero lower 
bound, monetary policy can use 
nonconventional tools (Mishkin, 2009). 
The zero lower bound policy 
rates became a serious problem even in 
the case of inflation targeters, since they 
all use the short-term interest rates as 
the main operating instruments of 
monetary policy (Masson, Savastano, 
Sharma, 1997). Before the current 
financial crisis, the inflation targeting was 
broadly considered as the best practice 
monetary policy. Although this strategy 
has managed to maintain low and stable 
inflation without causing the greater 
output volatility, its opponents have 
foreseen and the current crisis has raised 
new questions on the future of inflation 
targeting (Walsh, 2009).  
These questions are about how 
monetary policy should be conducted, 
the role played by monetary policy in the 
crisis, and the changes in the way of 
which inflation targeting should be 
conducted. As for the first question, 
under the impact of crisis, the monetary 
policy had to be temporarily adjusted in a 
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support financial stability, more precisely, 
for the improvement of the fragile 
situation of the financial sector and 
gaining some time for a the reform and 
recovery of the financial sector Thus, the 
financial crisis and the severe recession 
that has followed it have motivated the 
central banks to operate large cuts in the 
monetary policy interest rate. But, we 
should take into account the fact that 
trying to use interest rates to attain 
financial stability would cause significant 
collateral harm to inflation and the real 
economy (Svensson, 2009). 
About the second question, the 
most important conditions causing the 
current crisis had very little connection 
with monetary policy, being principally 
linked to insufficient regulatory framework 
and, to some extent, to some particular 
circumstances, including the United 
States’ housing policy (Svensson, 2009). 
So, we cannot make inflation 
targeting responsible for a crisis, which 
emerged in a country – United States – 
whose central bank does not practice this 
strategy. If we consider the crisis as a 
negative aggregate demand shock 
causing both the decline of output and 
inflation, then even a strict inflation 
targeter would react with expansionary 
monetary policy to avoid the collapse of 
aggregate spending (Walsh, 2009).  
Under inflation targeting the 
central bank is committed to ensure price 
stability. Thus, recessionary pressures on 
the real economy require expansionary 
monetary policy responses. The general 
agreement that monetary policy should 
only be preoccupied with price stability 
may have contributed, somewhat, to the 
financial crisis by ignoring financial 
distortions. But this failure was not limited 
to inflation targeters. The presence of 
financial distortions calls for central 
banks to trade-off some stability of 
inflation and real economic activity to 
ensure financial stability (Walsh, 2009).  
The assurance of financial 
stability, as well as a well-functioning 
payment system, represents, explicitly or 
implicitly, a main objective for central 
banks, which can be compatible with a 
flexible inflation targeting framework. In 
normal situations financial stability does 
not impose any constraints on monetary 
policy. The best instruments to achieve 
financial stability are supervision and 
regulation. But, in a lot of countries 
responsible for these instruments are 
other institutions than the central bank 
(Svensson, 2009).  
There is a wide consensus that 
price stability is not sufficient to ensure 
financial stability, which requires a robust 
regulation, including new 
macroprudential tools. However, the 
financial stability is generally not a 
monetary policy concern. The 
improvement of regulatory framework 
and the new macroprudential tools will 
change the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy and, thus, the 
implementation of monetary policy 
(Carney, 2009).   
Prior to the crisis, the most 
financial stability mandates were quite 
ambiguous and the supposition that price 
stability was consistent with financial 
stability led to few conflicts. While the 
crisis, financial stability mandate should 
strengthen and the compromise between 
price stability and financial stability has 
occurred. The question is if the central 
bank can jointly optimize the both 
objectives. As an answer to this dilemma, 
some inflation targeters take into 
consideration the solution to adjust the 
price stability objective and to move to 
the price-level targeting (Carney, 2009). 
Price level targeting would be a 
viable alternative to inflation targeting, 
being superior in terms of the way in 
which it can change expectations so they 
serve as an automatic stabilizer. The 
advantages of price level targeting 
depends seriously on its credibility and 
the experience with inflation targeting 
show that credibility takes time gain. But 
the adoption of price level targeting is not 
recommended during the crisis (Walsh, 
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In spite of these new debates, a 
flexible inflation targeting, applied in the 
proper way and taking into account all 
the information regarding the relevant 
financial factors for the inflation forecast 
and resource utilization at any horizon, 
can be considered as the best-practice 
monetary policy before, during, and after 
the financial crisis. However it 
immediately calls for an improved 
theoretical, empirical and operational 
understanding of the role of financial 
factors in the transmission mechanism of 




The current financial crisis was 
produced by causes which had very little 
connection with monetary policy, and, 
consequently, we cannot make it 
responsible for crisis. Moreover, the 
origins of the crisis are located in a 
country which is not an inflation targeter.  
In the context of the current 
crisis, the monetary policy became more 
expansionist, many central banks 
operating large cuts in the monetary 
policy interest rate. But, the interest-rate 
policy is not enough to achieve financial 
stability. Trying to use interest rates to 
attain financial stability would cause 
significant collateral harm to inflation and 
the real economy. 
Furthermore, price stability is not 
sufficient to attain financial stability. 
Excellent flexible inflation targeting by 
itself does not support financial stability. 
This requires specific policies and 
instruments, being generally not a 
monetary policy objective.  
In spite of the new debates about 
the possibility to move towards price level 
targeting, the strategy of inflation 
targeting can be considered as the best-
practice monetary policy before, during, 
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